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THE LOSS OF INSTITUTIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND THEIR DECLINE IN THE 
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
Jose Manuel Sobrino Heredia1
Never before have international organisations (IOs) been as numerous or 
as questioned as they are today. One reason for this, I believe, is the shift away 
from institutionalisation, which renders them inoperative and, thus, irrelevant. 
This decline in the institutional component of  IOs has caused – and continues 
to cause – many of  them to become empty shells with acronyms. Their bodies 
are purely testimonial and are supplanted in decision-making by their member 
states, which prefer informal agreement mechanisms that can be pursued 
outside or in parallel to the institutional procedures provided for in the IO’s 
constitutive treaty.
This preference of  states to act in parallel to – or instead of  – IOs’ 
bodies when dealing with issues falling under their jurisdiction erodes their 
institutional component. As a result, the organisations cease to be – as set out 
in their constitutive treaties – true centres of  decision-making and action based 
on a specific, independent, and permanent institutional structure consisting of  
bodies responsible for managing collective interests and capable of  expressing a 
will that is legally different from that of  their member states. They thus become 
mere institutional skeletons.
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This trend can be seen, first, in the weak institutional framework with 
which the most recent IOs have been endowed (e.g. the Pacific Alliance, the 
Union of  South American Nations (UNASUR), the Forum for the Progress 
and Development of  South America (PROSUR), the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SCO)). It is likewise evident in the search by the member states 
of  many other IOs for less demanding and more flexible formulas than those 
provided for in the organisations’ founding treaties with a view to deviating from 
the established procedures and bodies responsible for them in order to reach 
agreements on the most sensitive matters (e.g. the Andean Community (CAN), 
the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), the Association of  Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), the European Union (EU)). Finally, it is clear in 
the preference for non-institutionalised multilateral cooperation frameworks 
endowed with scant decision-making power in which the participating states 
seek consensus-based decisions (G5, G8, G13, G20, BRIC, BRICS, BRICS 
Plus, etc.).
This phenomenon of  institutional erosion affects the very essence of  IOs. 
It is worth recalling that IOs emerged as subjects of  international law precisely 
from the confluence of  multilateral treaties and the permanent institutional 
structures that give continuity to international conferences. The institutional 
element was present at the inception of  IOs and has remained a fixture of  their 
developed over time. Specifically, this institutional framework first appeared in 
the mid-19th century in the form of  the first River Commissions established 
in Europe. It was then reaffirmed and universalised in the first half  of  the 
20th century as a result of  the numerous international administrative unions 
that were created, and it became a hallmark feature of  modern IOs when, well 
into the 20th century, the UN was created and IOs proliferated in international 
society.
Those IOs – again, an expression of  institutionalised multilateral 
cooperation – have since evolved and today promote and oversee cooperation 
and even integration processes in a wide variety of  fields at both the regional 
and universal level. However, this evolution, which has witnessed the emergence 
of  hundreds of  IOs in the international legal and political landscape, has not 
always been homogeneous or even similar. The reasons are twofold. First, each 
IO is created for its own specific reasons, making them quite different from 
each other. Second, not all have advanced at the same pace, with some petering 
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out shortly after their founding, whilst others have become firmly established 
in international life.
Indeed, not all IOs have managed or are managing to achieve the goals that 
their founding states set for them when they were created. This has generated a 
disregard for them that often turns them into hollow husks devoid of  content. 
That, coupled with the growing unilateralism promoted by various global powers, 
has led to an increasing lack of  interest in IOs as facilitators of  better and more 
effective international cooperation and, as noted, the emergence of  informal, 
scarcely institutionalised international forums as preferable alternatives.
Thus, whilst IOs were a significant innovation in the organisation of  
international relations in the last century, today their role has been called into 
question and they face increasingly intense competition. This competition comes 
both from other IOs and, especially, from new forms of  barely institutionalised 
multilateral cooperation that seem better adapted to today’s realities and that 
welcome other increasingly influential international actors, such as transnational 
corporations or NGOs, which are rarely able to participate fully in IOs. This 
significantly reduces interest in IOs as forums for political negotiations and 
conflict mitigation, ultimately leading to a deterioration in their institutional 
structure, which, as we will see, stagnates due to disuse.
This deterioration of  the institutional dimension of  IOs conceals a dual 
reality. The first is the fact that many IOs were founded with very ambitious 
goals, but lacking the necessary organic structures to achieve them. As a result, 
their member states ultimately turned away from them to seek, in parallel, 
more agile formulas for intergovernmental cooperation that could be more 
easily bent to their wills, as reflected, for instance, in the rocky history of  
UNASUR. The second is the exact opposite situation, namely, IOs that were 
given sophisticated and complex institutional structures, but not the necessary 
financial, human, and material resources. As a result, they soon became mere 
institutional facades lacking actual powers, considerably compromising their 
effectiveness, with some lapsing into a sort of  institutional coma from which 
they will be hard-pressed to awaken, as is the case of  several African regional 
organisations.
This phenomenon does not change the fact that there are also other IOs 
– albeit substantially fewer, I believe – that have succeeded in adapting their 
institutional structures to the needs arising from changes in international 
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society and, also, in the society covered by the IO itself. This institutional 
adaptation has allowed them to achieve their pursued objectives and carry out 
very fruitful work in international life, as exemplified, with varying degrees of  
success, by the EU, the Council of  Europe, the Organization of  American 
States (OAS), ASEAN, the CAN, or the Central American Integration System 
(SICA), amongst others.
In any case, regardless of  which ones are or are not the site of  multilateral 
cooperation, the truth is that they all belie an obvious fact, namely, the 
fundamental role of  the will of  the member states in the future of  IOs. This 
circumstance is present even in the most advanced integration organisations, 
which are also exposed to the specific interests of  their states. This means 
that not even the most developed and evolved institutional and regulatory 
framework can be effective without the political will to apply it. So, whilst it is 
true that, as we will see, institutions are an essential element of  IOs, it is no less 
true that ultimately this institutional framework is conditioned by the will of  the 
member states, who continue to hold the keys for its effective operation. Thus, 
all IOs will have an institutional structure, but its scope will differ from one to 
the next because it is conditioned by the use that the member states make of  it. 
One need only look at the imprint of  Latin American political leaders on that 
region’s IOs, which completely conditions their operation and the activity of  
their institutions.
Even if  IOs are not a univocal reality, but rather vary according to their 
composition, purpose, structure, and powers, all are experiencing a loss of  
institutional density, albeit to different degrees. This article will examine this 
phenomenon. To this end, first, it will explain why institutions are an essential 
and defining feature of  IOs. It will then show how this institutional framework 
is subject to internal and external pressures that weaken it, threatening the 
effective operation of  many IOs and encouraging states to seek less formal 
alternatives to cooperate with each other.
With regard to the first aspect, an institutional framework is obviously 
an essential component of  an IO. As such, it was the combination of  this 
framework with the legal basis provided by multilateral treaties that led to the 
emergence of  the first IOs. Of  course, at the start, this institutional framework 
was elementary, as the nascent IOs needed few bodies to enable and ensure their 
operation. However, over time and with the emergence of  new IOs with much 
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broader powers, this institutional structure became richer and more complex, 
as exemplified by the United Nations (UN). This universal organisation is 
endowed with an advanced institutional framework that, moreover, has been 
formally reinforced over the years with a network of  institutions, bodies, 
organisations, and agencies that serve as the institutional scaffolding for its 
wide-ranging activity.
The UN’s institutional structure has clearly been the mirror in which the 
numerous IOs to emerge in international life since World War II have measured 
themselves. Two circumstances drove the creation and proliferation of  these 
IOs: first, the revitalisation of  international administrative unions and universal 
technical bodies; second, the institutionalisation of  international regionalism 
through the creation of  numerous regional IOs. The result is the presence of  
some 350 IOs on the international stage today, most of  which have a regional 
scope, although a minority are universal. A comparative examination reveals a 
large variety of  institutional structures. Some are quite complex, as in the cases 
of  the CAN, the SICA, the Economic Community of  West African States 
(ECOWAS), and the EU, whilst others are quite simple, as with the Community 
of  Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) or the Collective Security 
Treaty Organisation (CSTO). However, all have bodies that give permanence 
and continuity to the IO, regardless of  whether this permanence is real or 
fictitious, effective or irrelevant.
The importance of  an institutional structure is clear in the very definition 
that should be given to IOs, which does not stray far from that proposed by 
the International Law Commission (ILC) in its Draft articles on the responsibility 
of  international organisations, i.e. voluntary associations of  states established by 
international agreement, endowed with their own permanent, independent 
bodies, responsible for managing collective interests and capable of  expressing 
a will that is legally distinct from that of  their members. The existence of  these 
bodies is, thus, essential to be considered an IO.
However, this institutional structure is further conditioned by the fact that 
IOs are made up almost exclusively of  sovereign states, which do not lose their 
sovereignty simply by acceding to the IO. At most – and only in the most 
advanced integration IOs – they may attribute the exercise of  that sovereignty 
to institutions of  the organisation. Consequently, in reality, it is their will that, 
in essence, determines whether or not the IO can advance. And what kind of  
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institutional structures are created – how dense or insubstantial they are, how 
many powers they have – will likewise depend on that will. So will whether 
these institutions are given the human and material resources needed to carry 
out these powers in order to fulfil the common objectives established in their 
founding treaties.
However, although the presence of  states is crucial to the existence of  an 
IO, in creating an IO, the states endow it with international legal personality. 
This makes it a distinct subject of  international law from its member states, 
capable of  developing and expressing its own autonomous legal will. The scope 
of  this autonomy is closely linked to its institutional structure and the use the 
member states make of  it, as that is where this will is developed.
The uncompromising individuality that characterises IOs explains why 
there is no institutional structure common to them all, for no two IOs are 
alike. Moreover, an IO’s institutional organisational chart is not static, but rather 
subject to the dynamism of  the phenomenon in which it is applied; hence, 
the institutional structure is often modified to adapt it to new international 
circumstances or changes in the internal order of  the organisation itself. 
Therefore, although an institutional framework is an inherent feature of  all 
IOs, this does not mean that this feature is the same in all IOs, as I have said.
This is largely because the organic structure on which the IO’s institutional 
framework is based depends on the functions assigned to it by its member 
states and the objectives they pursue. Nevertheless, most IOs have bodies 
responsible for developing the general lines of  their policy, namely, the 
deliberative bodies. There are also usually bodies responsible for making its 
regulatory or operational decisions: these are the decision-making bodies. 
Finally, there are bodies responsible for implementing these decisions and 
running the organisation: these are the administrative bodies. In addition to 
these three categories of  bodies, present in most IOs, there are two new types 
of  institutions resulting from the deepening of  cooperation and integration in 
certain organisations: bodies for the legal control (courts) or political control 
(parliamentary assemblies) of  the organisation’s activity, and advisory bodies 
that report to it in the sectors in which it conducts its activity.
However, not all IOs’ institutional structures include all these bodies. Thus, 
intergovernmental bodies, made up of  representatives of  the member states, 
can be found in most IOs, but bodies made up of  independent individuals 
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from the member states acting on behalf  of  the organisation itself  are found 
only in the most advanced IOs. Likewise, whilst administrative bodies are a 
common feature of  all IOs, they differ in terms of  their powers and make-up. 
And although the vast majority of  IOs do have deliberative, decision-making, 
and administrative bodies, few have institutional structures including bodies 
to exercise legal or political control, i.e. courts or parliamentary assemblies. 
Bodies for exercising legal control may be the best proof  of  the strength of  the 
institutional framework an IO has achieved.
Furthermore, although most IOs have a minimum institutional density, in 
some IOs, some or all of  the institutional functions are carried out not by 
their bodies (which they may lack), but by the national authorities of  their 
member states on a pro tempore and rotating basis. This is exemplified by one 
of  the most highly regarded Latin American regional IOs, often held up as a 
benchmark for new models of  IOs, namely, the Pacific Alliance. Therefore, 
whilst an institutional framework is an essential feature of  IOs, it does not have 
the same scope in all of  them.
As a general rule, an IO’s bodies are created directly by its founding treaty. 
These constitutive instruments usually contain provisions establishing, in 
varying detail, what their bodies are and what functions they perform. This is 
typically developed in protocols annexed to the founding treaty, establishing the 
statute of  the institution in question, which, in turn, usually draws up internal 
regulations for its operation.
However, this initial institutional structure may not be enough to meet 
the demands arising from the organisation’s operation in practice, making it 
necessary to create new bodies, as clearly occurred with the UN, Mercosur, 
the CAN, or ASEAN. The decision to create new bodies may be made by 
pre-existing bodies of  the IO through an act of  secondary law or adopted by 
its member states through an international agreement supplementing the IO’s 
constitutive treaty. In the former case, the new body will be a subsidiary body 
of  the one that creates it (the main body), which will confer on it some of  
the powers that it has in accordance with the IO’s rules. However, in order to 
fulfil new functions or further develop existing ones, the member states may 
also create a specific institution to link to the IO by means of  an international 
agreement. They can likewise make changes to the IO’s bodies through a 
subsequent treaty.
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As an IO’s institutional structure becomes denser and more sophisticated, 
the decision-making techniques within it become more complex and advanced, 
as do the resolutions resulting from that process. In this regard, those IOs with 
the power to create legal rules of  a general scope, all of  whose elements are 
mandatory and endowed with a direct effect (the EU, CAN or Mercosur), will 
do so through institutional structures in which bodies representing the interests 
of  the states, of  the organisation itself, and of  the states’ nationals participate 
to a greater or lesser extent.
Furthermore, in these types of  organisations, it is fairly common for these 
resolutions to be adopted by majority – as opposed to unanimously or by 
consensus – which is possible because of  the powers assigned to them by the 
member states. These IOs have very strong institutions, which is quite rare and 
more likely to occur in the framework of  regional IOs (so-called organisations 
in the process of  integration) than universal ones (where it happens in certain 
technical organisations or in the UN itself  with regard to the decisions of  the 
Security Council). Additionally, this strong institutional framework is usually 
real and not merely formal, unlike with many IOs in Africa, which are endowed 
with extensive organic structures, but whose institutions lack real powers, or, 
if  they can adopt resolutions, can do so only in relation to resolutions of  a 
very limited legal scope. On the other hand, in these IOs with more advanced 
integration or cooperation processes, when the leaders of  the member states 
are not politically aligned, it can and does lead to a decline in the number of  
resolutions and a weakening of  the actions of  their institutions, as seen in the 
SICA, CAN or Mercosur.
In contrast, in those IOs that have opted for a weaker institutional 
framework, resolutions are usually adopted by consensus or unanimously (as in 
the cases of  the Pacific Alliance, UNASUR or CELAC). In times of  political 
and ideological affinity between the heads of  government of  the member 
states, this is not a problem; however, in the absence of  such affinity, it can 
plunge the IO into a deep lethargy, as has often happened in the Americas. 
Indeed, the Americas are the best stage to see this pendular movement of  such 
IOs play out. Controlled by the heads of  the member states’ governments, 
they move at the pace determined by the common ground or disagreements 
between them. This impacts their institutional dimension, as the governments 
sometimes show a clear disregard for the institutions of  the IO to which they 
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belong, as exemplified several times over the years by UNASUR, through the 
complexity of  designating its Secretary-General, a position that today is vacant. 
The existence of  an institutional structure is closely linked to the likelihood 
of  an IO developing a legal will that is truly autonomous from that of  its 
member states. So, although it is not always true that the greater an IO’s formal 
institutional framework (i.e. the denser its bodies), the greater its regulatory 
powers will be (suffice it to look at the IOs in Africa and the Pacific), broad 
and effective regulatory power does seem to require the IO to have strong 
institutions. In order to be real, this effectiveness must be accompanied by 
bodies that previously carry out a political control of  the rule (parliamentary 
assemblies) and bodies that see to its legal control, both previously and 
subsequently (courts). The conjunction of  all these factors occurs in very few 
IOs. Furthermore, political or temporary reasons may prompt the leaders 
of  the member states to sidestep institutional obstacles and instead pursue 
agreements outside the bodies, whether via informal meetings, as in the EU, or 
formal ones, as in the CAN.
The variety and heterogeneity of  the institutional structures is thus an 
undeniable reality in the world of  IOs. Each IO is a legal entity in itself, with its 
own organic structure that is ultimately the result of  each specific IO’s freedom 
of  self-organisation, which, in most cases, actually means the result of  the will 
of  the states that make it up.
It could thus be concluded that having a specific, permanent, independent 
structure is an inherent feature of  an IO. However, the characteristics thereof, 
its composition, and the scope of  its regulatory powers are quite diverse and 
variable. Diverse because, as noted, no two IOs are the same in this sphere, 
and variable because IOs are extremely dynamic subjects of  international law 
and, in general, their institutional structures undergo changes over the course 
of  their lives. Nevertheless, IOs are always manifestations of  institutionalised 
multilateral cooperation, albeit of  variable geometry.
Let us now turn to the second part of  this article and see how the development 
of  this institutionalised multilateral cooperation depends closely on the will 
of  the states conducting it. They may be inclined to make this cooperation 
both effectively multilateral and institutionalised or, in contrast, prefer unilateral 
informal mechanisms to cooperate amongst themselves. And the truth is that 
the advance of  international society points towards a rampant unilateralism that 
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either supplants IOs as forums for international negotiation or strips them of  
all or part of  their substance by neglecting their institutions, which are blamed 
for the IOs’ scant agility and excessive bureaucracy. This feeling often leads 
the member states to look for alternative cooperation mechanisms outside the 
institutional framework intrinsic to the IO to which they belong. In many IOs, 
this is accompanied by a worrying loss of  institutionalisation, as I will try to 
show below.
If  an IO is the product of  a consensus of  state wills, formalised in an 
international agreement, the absence of  that will – which is an attribute of  
sovereignty – or the loss of  enthusiasm by a member state for the institutionalised 
multilateral cooperation process will interfere with the IO’s development. Such 
disaffection can manifest in many ways, from an ‘empty chair’ policy (e.g. the 
USSR in the UN Security Council or France in the Council of  the then EEC) to 
outright withdrawal from the organisation. Cases of  the latter have proliferated 
in recent years: the United States from universal IOs, the United Kingdom 
from the EU, Venezuela from the OAS, Brazil from CELAC, Ecuador from 
the Bolivarian Alliance of  the Americas (ALBA), or numerous countries from 
UNASUR. In many of  these cases, the radical stances of  the member states 
were due to their disapproval of  the institutional structure of  the IO to which 
they belonged, of  the powers of  its bodies, or of  a decision these bodies had 
adopted that, in their view, was harmful to their national interests.
In addition to withdrawal from IOs, international practice also offers 
many examples of  cases in which, without resorting to such a drastic measure, 
member states have used formulas foreign or parallel to the IO’s institutional 
structure to resolve conflicts or further their cooperation. In this regard, it 
is worth recalling the mini summits held between some heads of  state and 
of  government within the framework of  European integration to advance 
on specific aspects of  integration or resolve conflicts arising in relation to it, 
bypassing the EU’s own institutions. Nor is this exclusive to the EU. It can also 
be seen in many other regional IOs, such as the CAN, Mercosur, or ASEAN, 
amongst others.
This flight from institutionalised multilateral cooperation mechanisms has 
many other manifestations too. These include the search for less formal means 
of  cooperation than those provided by IOs, the preference for more informal 
alternatives for interstate cooperation, such as the G5, G8, G13, G20, or BRIC, 
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BRICS, and BRICS Plus groupings, i.e. forums to which states that share certain 
concerns or characteristics can turn, even if  they are not homogeneous groups. 
Some bring together emerging powers, others the world’s most developed 
industrial economies, and still others both. However, all have rather lightweight 
structures, more akin to an international conference than an international 
organisation.
In these forums or groups for dialogue, it falls to the host country to 
organise the corresponding summits, to which end it must task its own civil 
service with achieving that objective, since the forum itself  has no institutional 
structure. This lack of  an institutional framework, i.e. the essentially diplomatic 
nature of  the meetings, means that the resolutions adopted at such summits 
are not legally binding. Instead, they are mere political declarations of  varying 
importance, the purpose of  which is to analyse the state of  international policy 
and economies and to try to agree to common positions on the decisions taken 
with regard to the global political and economic system.
They are also informal associations of  states, not based on international 
treaties. This does not prevent the participants from subsequently formalising 
specific instances of  cooperation through bilateral agreements or memoranda 
of  understanding, nor does it mean that they cannot lead to the creation of  an 
international organisation. The BRIC countries were key to the emergence of  
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, but the two should not be confused.
Considerable diplomatic activity often plays out in the shadow of  these 
groups, as illustrated by the BRICS, which hold two summits each year, one 
basic and the other within the scope of  the G20 meeting, as well as around a 
hundred official activities, including about 20 at the ministerial level. This does 
not mean that there is real cohesion between the participating states, but rather 
a disparity of  interests that hinders the group’s operation.
This disillusionment with IOs, and the proliferation of  international interest 
groups, is largely determined by the personalities of  the current political leaders 
of  the governments of  the United States (until recently), Russia, India, Brazil, 
China, and the United Kingdom, the behaviour of  whose countries casts 
doubt on institutionalised multilateral cooperation. They do this not only 
by using informal unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral channels to pursue the 
international relations of  interest to them, but also by engaging in behaviours 
that interfere with the functioning of  various important IOs to which they 
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belong and with which they should cooperate loyally. This behaviour can take 
the form of  criticism of  the IO, the freezing of  the country’s contributions to 
it, or obstruction of  its operation (see the Trump Administration’s behaviour 
towards several IOs, such as the WTO) or, on the contrary, of  a suffocating 
presence in them, as some have said is the case of  China in the WHO, the 
immediate effect of  which is to call the organisation’s impartiality into question. 
This blow to the institutional framework of  IOs and to multilateral 
cooperation in general was on blatant display with the previous US 
administration, which ostentatiously denounced and withdrew from several 
multilateral agreements, eventually targeting the UN itself, the ultimate symbol 
of  multilateralism. This happened recently, and we do not yet know whether the 
new US administration is in a position to repair the damage done, for example, 
to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (2017), the Paris Agreement – the withdrawal 
from which was first announced in 2017 and formally notified in 2019 – or the 
UN Global Compact for Migration (2017). Along similar lines, in 2019, the 
United States also denounced the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, a 
key agreement that helped end the Cold War.
This policy of  abandoning multilateralism and great global consensuses in 
favour of  a firm commitment to unilateralism or bilateralism was also evident 
in the US withdrawal from several international bodies and organisations. One 
of  the most notorious took place in 2018, when it quit the UN Human Rights 
Council. However, it was not the first. In October 2017, the US had announced 
its withdrawal from Unesco. In August 2018, it eliminated its funding for the 
UN Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA). And, in October 2017, it 
announced it would withdraw from one of  the world’s oldest IOs, the Universal 
Postal Union. It remains to be seen how quickly the Biden Administration will 
try to remedy these situations and whether it will decide to address them all or 
leave them at a political and diplomatic impasse.
The fact of  the matter is that, brazenly or subtly, global powers seek to mould 
IOs to their own interests and, when they do not like their institutions, boycott 
or leave them. One need only recall the Trump Administration’s behaviour and 
the statements of  the former US president himself, criticising the treatment 
the country allegedly received from the WTO, blocking its dispute settlement 
system, and bringing the appointment of  new members to the organisation’s 
Appellate Body to a halt. But these behaviours have not only played out in 
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relation to universal IOs. They have also harmed IOs, such as the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), whose operation was not to the 
liking of  one of  its member states. The United States forced its replacement 
with a new more protectionist free trade agreement, more favourable to its 
interests, signing, together with Mexico and Canada, the United States-Mexico-
Canada Agreement (USMCA) in November 2018. Again, it remains to be seen 
whether the new US administration will stay this course or change tack and 
return to the previous institutional mechanisms.
Actions such as those of  the US, or of  Brazil in the Southern Cone, or 
Venezuela in the CAN, that slam the door on IOs when the member state does 
not like their actions, exemplify the rejection of  institutionalised multilateralism 
and hinder the IOs’ work, their role as international actors, and the usefulness 
of  their institutions. They encourage their replacement with less demanding 
intergovernmental negotiation forums, whilst simultaneously promoting a 
strategy based on bilateral agreements that, due to the potential differences in 
the various parties’ influence, ultimately allow the interests of  the strongest to 
prevail.
This is a landscape in which Russia, historically detached from IOs, seems 
to be comfortable. It has once again become decisive to many international 
events, and the solutions to the international problems that arise are likely to 
require the intervention of  the Kremlin. The same is true of  China, which is 
increasingly active – in its own way – in international life and, thus, involved in 
various conflicts, especially trade conflicts with different partners, in particular, 
the United States. The solution to these does not lie in any of  the institutions 
of  the numerous IOs in which both are members.
Indeed, both Russia and China are comfortable outside the framework 
of  traditional IOs, either fostering very lightweight associations and weak 
institutional structures, such as the CSTO, the SCO, or the BRICS themselves, 
or through markedly bilateral relations.
The positioning of  these two countries with regard to institutionalised 
multilateral cooperation has also negatively impacted the functioning of  the 
UN and, especially, the Security Council. One need only look at how they are 
hampering the always complicated operation of  this UN body, multiplying the 
vetoes of  the resolutions the institution aims to adopt on situations of  tension 
or international conflicts. Tensions and conflicts to which these two powers 
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are obviously not indifferent. Witness, for example, Russia’s opposition in the 
Security Council, on 28 February 2019, in relation to the exceptional situation 
in Venezuela, for which it once again had China’s support when it came time 
to vote.
In another geopolitical environment, the loss of  prominence of  IOs in 
resolving regional problems has led to the creation of  new political negotiation 
forums to solve them outside the IOs. For instance, in Latin America, in relation 
to the ongoing crisis in Venezuela, the OAS’s internal paralysis has led to the 
creation of  two negotiating groups, the Lima Group (2017) and the alternative 
Puebla Group (2019). These groups, in turn, are subject to the political fortunes 
of  the governments of  their member states. Likewise, some of  the most 
innovative American IOs have been stymied by disagreements between the 
region’s political leaders, their institutions proving unable to prevent it or serve 
as a forum for negotiation, as in the case of  CELAC or UNASUR. To a large 
extent, the (intentionally) weak institutional framework of  these organisations 
made such an outcome a foregone conclusion.
It is also worth mentioning some events that I believe are examples of  
unilateralism, disregard, and a certain harassment of  some IOs or specific 
bodies thereof. In this case, the examples expose the vulnerability of  certain 
international courts and control bodies. This group would include the attacks 
on the Southern African Development Community Court (SADCC), where 
the hostility of  one member state (Zimbabwe) has blocked the appointment of  
new judges and led to a reduction in its jurisdictional powers. It would likewise 
include those on the Inter-American Commission of  Human Rights, which, 
due to pressure from some OAS member states, has been brought to the brink 
of  a financial abyss; the Inter-American Court of  Human Rights itself, which 
can only look on as states that disagree with its judgments abandon it; or, finally, 
the Central American Court of  Justice, whose judgments frequently fall on 
deaf  ears or are rejected by certain members of  SICA. Another universal IO of  
a jurisdictional nature, the International Criminal Court, is in a similarly delicate 
situation. In recent years, some of  its members, in particular African countries, 
have denounced the Rome Statute.
This aversion to or lack of  interest in a strong institutional framework for 
IOs is not only evidenced in these IOs. In my view, it is a universal phenomenon 
that today stands in contrast with the history of  IOs itself. To illustrate this, 
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I will refer to the effects that the emergence of  the European integration 
organisations in the 1950s had on the world of  IOs. At the time, these 
organisations were a major catalyst for institutionalised multilateral cooperation 
processes insofar as they introduced profound changes in the types of  bodies 
that IOs had had until then. These changes or advances in the institutional 
framework of  IOs soon became a benchmark for the regional IOs beginning 
to emerge and proliferate on various continents at the time, which began to 
copy the European IOs’ institutional system with varying degrees of  success. 
However, merely copying this institutional structure, with many bodies but few 
powers, without endowing them with the human and material means to carry 
them out quickly led to disillusionment, which, in turn, led to the questioning 
of  their usefulness and the search for alternatives outside them.
In short, other IOs have copied the institutional system built in the process 
of  European integration: similar institutions, legal systems, goals, and purposes. 
However, they have done so with the added difficulty of  the vast difference 
between the socio-economic conditions and political realities in Europe and 
in Latin America and the Caribbean and on other continents. IOs such as the 
CAN, SICA, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), ECOWAS or Mercosur 
bear witness to this reality. In these cases, the institutional mimicry is quite 
pronounced, sometimes not only formally but, in a certain sense, in a real way. 
For example, the Andean Integration System, which encompasses the set of  
institutions and bodies within the CAN, has seen the emergence of  institutions 
very similar to their European counterparts and typical of  organisations in very 
advanced processes of  integration, such as the Court of  Justice, the Andean 
Parliament, etc. In other cases, the mimicry is more formal than real – judging 
by the bodies’ achievements. For instance, CARICOM’s Caribbean Court of  
Justice has very limited jurisdiction. In Mercosur, the Permanent Court of  
Arbitration, established in the absence of  a Court of  Justice, languishes for want 
of  cases and disputes to settle and the Parliament plays a purely advisory role. 
And whilst the SICA also has a very highly developed institutional structure 
with bodies formally similar to those of  the EU, the Court of  Justice (the CCJ) 
and Parliament (PARLACEM) established within its sphere of  action are often 
more testimonial than effective. The same is true in Africa, where numerous 
IOs have copied the European institutional framework, albeit trying to adapt it 
– without much luck – to very different realities. This can be seen in ECOWAS, 
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which also has a Court of  Justice, a Parliament, and a Bank for Investment and 
Development, or the AU itself, some of  whose institutions have had a complex 
existence.
This discouragement or disregard also arises from the fact that these IOs 
endowed with ambitious institutional structures at the same time suffer the 
consequences of  the challenges inherent in managing them. Their maintenance 
(e.g. the Andean Parliament in Bogota), usefulness (the High Representative 
General of  Mercosur), or the scope of  the resolutions of  some of  their bodies 
(e.g. the judgments of  the Central American Court of  Justice or the resolutions 
of  the ECOWAS Parliament) can sometimes be costly or they may engage in 
only minimal activity (the SICA Executive Committee). These obstacles have 
often prompted attempts to relaunch these structures (Mercosur) or even, 
due to the overwhelming complexity of  the problem, the commissioning of  a 
study from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) on their ‘institutional reengineering’, in the case of  the CAN. But 
in all cases these processes depend heavily on the will of  the regional political 
leaders. Consequently, changes in their ideological orientations immediately 
affect the institutions’ functioning, as can be seen, to cite a current case, in 
Mercosur. Whilst this may enable the institutions’ continued existence, it 
strips them of  content, further weakening the material and human support 
that sustained them (e.g. through the drastic downsizing of  the number of  
officials, as in the cases of  the CAN or UNASUR). The result is an implicit 
deinstitutionalisation of  the organisation.
Something similar is happening with some IOs that were quite important 
in the past but, due to the inoperability of  their institutions and the eminently 
intergovernmental nature thereof, are today clearly in decline and haemorrhaging 
member states, as illustrated by the challenging situation the Organisation of  the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is currently going through. Created in 
1960 with the aim of  allowing the founding countries to control oil prices, 
today it is having trouble fulfilling its founding mission.
But in addition to this deinstitutionalisation resulting from the clash of  
regional realities with the ambitious institutional structures with which some 
IOs have been endowed, some IOs have, from the outset, chosen a weak or 
null institutional structure and, in any case, an exclusively intergovernmental 
one (Pacific Alliance, ALBA, ASEAN, CELAC, the SCO, the Association of  
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Caribbean States (ACS), UNASUR), straying – for technical or ideological 
reasons – from the European model of  regional integration. In these cases, 
the EU would thus be the model to avoid, along with its institutional density, 
seeking instead increased freedom of  action for the governments (re: the 
leaders) of  the member states. These IOs are less formal from an institutional 
and regulatory point of  view.
This commitment to a weaker, intergovernmental, and purely technical 
institutional framework can be found, for example, in ASEAN, the SCO, or the 
ACS. ASEAN, which already has a long history and is the most advanced IO 
in Asia, has seen how the incorporation of  new member states and advances 
in cooperation (Charter, Singapore, 2007) has been voluntarily hindered by a 
markedly intergovernmental and technical institutional framework. The case of  
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation similarly exemplifies the desire of  two 
of  the founding states, Russia and China, to endow it with only the minimal 
institutional framework. It has just two permanent bodies, the SCO Secretariat, 
headquartered in Beijing, and the Executive Committee of  the Regional Anti-
Terrorist Structure (SCO RATS), headquartered in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. They 
can thus control its operation.
The member states of  several relatively recently founded IOs show a similar 
lack of  interest in endowing them with a solid institutional structure. One 
such case is CELAC, which was launched with great fanfare in the 2010s as an 
alternative to the OAS, without the US or Canada. This organisation, steeped in 
ideology and the product of  the confluence of  a series of  declarations by heads 
of  state and government of  countries from the region, was launched without a 
specific founding treaty, institutional structure, or budget. A certain ideological 
confluence enabled the implementation and first steps of  this cooperation 
experiment on a nearly continental scale. However, the moment the first 
disagreements arose between the American leaders as a result of  changes in 
governments in the region, the consensus evaporated and the meetings turned 
sour. Not only did it become impossible to convene new summits, but the 
one already scheduled to be held in El Salvador in 2017 was suspended. The 
fracture that took place in this American IO led to its current lethargy, and 
although Mexico is determined to revive it, to date it has met with little success. 
Something similar has happened with ALBA (Bolivarian Alternative for the 
Americas), which emerged as a counterpoint to the Free Trade Area of  the 
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Americas (FTAA). Disregarding the IO model, it sought to establish itself  as 
a new formula for cooperation between ideologically aligned countries. To this 
end, a weak intergovernmental institutional structure was designed, to operate 
based on consensus and strict respect for the member states’ sovereignty. 
Political changes in some of  the most prominent countries in this association, 
such as Ecuador, Honduras, or, more recently, Bolivia (although there it has 
changed again), led, in practice, to the organisation’s paralysis.
Other IOs, such as UNASUR, are experiencing very similar situations. 
Created under the Brasilia Treaty of  2008 as a display of  a certain political 
consensus based on the ideological proximity of  the then presidents of  
Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela, it soon found itself  enmeshed in complex 
political situations arising in various countries in the region. The commitment 
to an essentially intergovernmental structure led by regional leaders was 
intended to be offset by the figure of  an independent Secretary General vested 
with powers. But the turbulent appointment process has made such a figure 
unviable, as witnessed by the fact that the position has remained unfilled since 
January 2017. The withdrawal of  many of  the member states (most recently, 
Bolivia, in November 2019) has dealt a lethal blow to this IO, leaving it – in fact 
if  not yet in law – all but defunct.
Finally, other IOs have chosen very lightweight, intergovernmental 
institutional systems not for ideological reasons but to enhance their efficiency 
and agility. This would be the case of  the Pacific Alliance, founded in 2012, as 
a regional bloc bringing together the main Latin American countries bordering 
that ocean with the aim of  deepening the economic integration of  its members. 
To this end, the members have not created any body specific to the organisation 
itself, which is instead sustained by the meetings held at various levels by the 
different member states, under the coordination of  one of  the members, which 
annually assumes the Alliance’s rotating presidency on a pro tempore basis. 
This experiment in regional cooperation has undeniably achieved outstanding 
results, but its lack of  an institutional framework makes it highly vulnerable to 
political changes in the region, such as that which has already taken place in 
Mexico, as well as to instability that spreads from one country to another, as in 
the case of  Peru or Chile. Whilst this may not be leading to the IO’s collapse, it 
is at the very least leading to a deep slowdown in its activities.
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As we have seen in this article, the IO universe is vast and plural, as are 
the institutional structures that support these organisations. IOs emerged from 
the confluence of  the phenomenon of  international conferences, multilateral 
treaties, and the establishment of  permanent institutional structures. The 
existence of  permanent, independent structures specific to the organisation 
itself  thus became one of  the distinctive or inherent features of  IOs. Institutions 
are thus a feature shared by IOs, but not so the scope thereof, which ultimately 
depends on the will of  their member states, who design the component bodies 
of  this framework, define their powers, and decide whether or not to use them. 
The institutional density of  some IOs is, in my opinion, a bulwark against 
critical action by some of  their member states and makes it possible for shared 
interests to prevail over the individual interests of  those states. Hence, the 
weaker the institutional framework, the more serious any contrary behaviours 
by one or more member states will be for the IO. Thus, whilst the withdrawal 
of  Colombia, Ecuador, Brazil, Argentina, and others from UNASUR seems 
destined to result in the demise of  that South American political forum, 
Venezuela’s withdrawal from the CAN has not had the same effect on that 
organisation, but rather resulted in a change in its strategy. Likewise, the UK’s 
withdrawal from the EU has become an antidote to the latter’s paralysis, 
ultimately strengthening the European organisation, which has proven capable 
of  giving a joint and institutional response to the British claims.
Obviously, however, as I have tried to show, the type of  strong and 
effective institutional framework that allows an IO to achieve the purposes for 
which it was created is not the formula that many states are embracing today, 
beginning with the great powers, which prefer other mechanisms. They are thus 
turning away from those established in the IOs of  which they are members, 
plunging them into a troubling impasse, in favour of  more lenient, flexible, and 
mouldable formulas that do not compromise their international responsibility 
or that derived from membership in an IO. This behaviour is leading them to 
lose interest in the IOs to which they belong, not to use their institutions or, 
even, to obstruct their operation.
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